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Financial market efficiency can be impaired by a combination of irrational 
pricing behaviour and limits upon arbitrageurs’ ability to eliminate the resulting mis-
pricings of financial assets. In the critique of financial market efficiency that has come 
to be called behavioural finance, a rigorously defined example of irrational behaviour 
is noise trading – trading that is highly correlated with what can only be called noise-
like movements in security prices. The theoretical explanations for hypothesised noise 
trading are varied; misperceptions of correct prices can arise from a number of 
psychological biases in perceptions of risk and return or arise from a utility of risk and 
return that is heavily biased towards loss aversion. Arbitrageurs can, however, 
overcome the risk attendant in facing noise traders if arbitrage is sufficiently well 
financed or there is sufficient time to deliver the required returns to arbitrageurs. 
Instances of successful arbitrage arise therefore in markets in which a simple form (at 
least) of market efficiency arises.
1
The literature on the South Sea Bubble has emphasised irrational behaviour as 
the dominant behaviour in financial markets, at least as far as explaining the 
spectacular rise in South Sea equity values, in 1720. The literature largely predates, 
however, the usage of the term 'irrational' as it appears in the writings on behavioural 
                         
1 See Shleifer’s Inefficient Markets, Introduction and Chapter 2.   3
finance discussed in the paragraph above. The literature moreover says nothing about 
the limits on arbitrage that could have limited irrational pricing of South Sea and other 
shares. The literature does present us with individual cases of successful and 
unsuccessful speculation, but the evidence does not clearly point to any instance of 
what the modern economist would call arbitrage. There are stories of famous winners 
(the Duchess of Marlborough and Sir Thomas Guy) and losers (Sir Isaac Newton and 
the Duke of Chandos) in the South Sea. To these old stories we must add the cases 
that come from more recent studies and which describe the successes and failures in 
trade by Sir Thomas Pitt, John Law, Richard Cantillon, Hoare's Bank and the Canton 
of Berne. As tantalising as the evidence is that some individuals, such as Law and 
Cantillon in particular, were engaged in what we would now call international risk 
arbitrage, the evidence is not conclusive. There also appears in the literature stories of 
individuals and institutions that made money in the South Sea Bubble simply by 
selling steadily into the rising market of 1720. 
In the next section of this paper, we review in brief this literature with regards to 
speculative, and possible arbitrage, activities of certain institutions and individuals. 
The summary conclusion that we take from this literature is that individuals and 
institutions did not succeed or fail as investors by trying to exploit mis-pricings 
between very similar securities. That would have been arbitrage. They either 
succeeded or failed, by luck or design, in the way they viewed the intertemporal 
movement in the market fundamental for shares. Further archival researches might yet 
find direct evidence of individual attempts at profitable arbitrage, but we do not think 
that such evidence is likely to be found. 
Subscription shares have been referred to also as subscription contracts. They 
were share purchase agreements that required a down-payment and subsequent 
payments to follow in scheduled instalments. Subsequent events in 1720 and in later   4
years suggest, however, that the general investing public did not necessarily see these 
contracts as simple instalment purchase contracts for shares, at least as far as South 
Sea shares were concerned. There is good evidence to suggest that the investing 
public viewed the South Sea subscription contracts as complex packages of call 
options on shares. In this paper we demonstrate that the Royal African Company 
avoided these problems with its subscription shares with a combination of good luck 
and prudent financial management. An option to default on subscription instalments 
was embedded in both South Sea and Royal African subscription shares, but because 
of the terms of their issue, maturity and the companies' respective management 
policies, the default option was practically worthless in the Royal African subscription 
shares, whereas it obtained high values in the South Sea subscription shares. 
 
Literature regarding speculation and arbitrage in 1720 
 
In this section we review what little recent literature there is that reflects upon 
individual (or institutional) speculation and arbitrage. In the course of the review, it 
will become clear why it is so unlikely that archives will produce clear cases of 
arbitrage by individuals and institutions. Evidence of arbitrage will have to be 
discovered in other ways than by looking at investor case histories. 
It has now been confirmed that John Law wrote a series of very large call 
options on East India shares for Lord Londonderry (Thomas Pitt). The exercise of 
these options were variously due in the middle to early autumn of 1720 and Neal 
(2000) writes of the difficulties that Law's agents had in honouring the calls. These 
difficulties strongly suggest that Law did not construct hedges against the risks he 
faced in writing these calls. In today's terms he was writing "naked" calls, which 
exposed him to liabilities that could only be capped by the limited extent to which 
East India shares could rise in value. Although we have few details, it also appears 
that by early 1720 Law was the author of some very large naked calls in South Sea   5
shares as well. The correspondence with his London banker suggests that these calls 
were very strongly in the money and about to expire to the great financial 
embarrassment of their author. Londonderry, for his part, appeared to be in a position 
in which he had to receive the settlement of the calls directly from Law's agents or 
receive nothing at all. Whether by design or necessity, Londonderry was to receive 
settlement of the calls by paying the exercise price and by taking possession of the 
shares. We know that Londonderry had earlier sold pieces of the call options he held 
to others, but he was still left in possession of a large quantity of these options. 
Londonderry obviously felt that he faced a very specific risk that Law would not be 
able to deliver on his calls and he even found it in his own interests to aid Law's 
agents in placing the shares at advantageous prices. Neal shows how Londonderry 
took appreciable steps to reduce the risks he faced, but these risks were quite unique 
risks because he was in possession of such a large number of in-the-money calls 
written by just one very wealthy and politically-powerful individual. 
Richard Cantillon’s financial contracts were extensive and varied, but it is 
impossible here too to place them within the context of arbitrage strategies. To take 
just one of the examples analysed by Murphy (1986), between March and May 1720 
Cantillon concentrated on the exchange rate policies being followed by John Law in 
his administration of the Mississippi Scheme. He made substantial loans to a number 
of individuals, but primarily to various members of the Powis family, Lady Mary 
Herbert and her father, Lord Montgomery. The value of these loans to Cantillon 
would have appreciated in the event of devaluation of French banknotes relative to 
specie, yet the collateral he accepted for these loans were in the form of Mississippi 
Company shares. Cantillon clearly expected that, because of the system being 
followed by Law, the value of Mississippi shares would rise or fall pari passu with 
the exchange rate between banknotes and specie, yet there is no apparent evidence   6
that he was concerned with risk that the collateral value for his loans would be low n 
value in the very circumstances in which he would likely have to retain the collateral.  
Sir Thomas Guy built the fortune that lay behind the charitable foundation of Sir 
Thomas Guy's Hospital by simply selling South Sea shares steadily into the rising 
market of early 1720. The largest known investor in English funds, the Canton of 
Berne, also did very well in 1720 by steadily selling South Sea shares that it had 
purchased in 1719. In the latter case there was a clear statement that the motive 
behind the strategy was simply to hold a low-risk portfolio. The financial directorate 
of the Canton viewed the rapid rise in South Sea share prices in early 1720 as a signal 
that the riskiness of South Sea shares were suddenly much higher than it had 
heretofore expected and the shares were peremptorily dumped (Altorfer, 2004). On a 
comparatively small scale, Hoare’s Bank purchased shares before the steepest run-up 
in prices and managed to sell a good portion of these shares before the market 
collapsed. Temin and Voth (2003) present a case that this was the result of a 
precocious trading strategy of "riding the bubble". 
Pure arbitrage requires the arbitrageur to take opposite positions in two assets 
that are precisely alike. Perhaps a bit easier to find are two assets, nearly alike in all 
respects except in their riskinesses. If there is a reward towards bearing risk that is 
easier for arbitrageurs to carry than for other persons in the markets to carry, another 
type of arbitrage – risk arbitrage might be detectable. Most likely this is the arbitrage 
in which Richard Cantillon and John Law were engaged if they were engaged in 
arbitrage at all. 
The other way to discover arbitrage is to analyse values for financial 
instruments that are very close substitutes for each other in order to look for mis-
pricings or successful arbitrage that prevents such mis-pricings. In this paper we 
consider the arbitrage relationship between fully-paid equity shares and subscription   7
shares. They were issued variously by many companies in the 18
th and 19
th centuries. 
It was common in the late 18
th and early 19th centuries that canal, railway and 
insurance companies would issue new equity shares on a subscription basis. This 
practice was followed by a number of new and existing companies in 1720 as well. 
What we shall examine in this paper are the unique arbitrage possibilities when 
subscription shares were issued and traded in parallel with fully-paid shares. 
This paper is the third in a series that concerns the role of subscription finance 
during the South Sea Bubble. The first paper (Shea (2007a)) was a correction to an 
analysis of South Sea Company subscription share values presented by Dale, Johnson 
and Tang (2005). After assuming that South Sea subscription shares were simply 
packages of fractional fully-paid South Sea shares and promised instalment payments 
to the firm, these authors then embarked upon an extensive econometric analysis to 
show that the required linear relationships between fully-paid and subscription share 
values could not be found in the data. They followed this analysis with conclusions 
about irrationality, hysteria, gambling mania, behaviour heuristics and the inevitable 
need for financial market regulation. But the results of their econometric analyses 
were simply predestined by their mistaken historical assumption about the nature of 
the South Sea subscription shares. It is abundantly clear in data that the dynamic 
relation between subscription share values and fully-paid share values was complex, 
but was a patently nonlinear relationship. Moreover, an analysis of the law and the 
subsequent history of the South Sea subscription shares suggested that the shares were 
regarded more like call options on South Sea shares, rather than packages of South 
Sea shares themselves. 
In the second paper (Shea (2007b)) was developed and tested an explicit pricing 
theory for the South Sea subscription shares. With an option to default upon 
subscriptions that was widely perceived to be exercisable, the South Sea subscription   8
shares would theoretically have been priced as compound call options on the South 
Sea Company’s fully-paid shares. A computational model closely mimicked the 
complex and nonlinear theoretical relationship between the fully-paid and 
subscription share values and demonstrated the existence of efficient arbitrage 
between the markets for these shares. 
The objectives of this paper, the third paper, are several. The first explicit 
analysis of subscription share values in 1720 concerned the Royal African Company’s 
subscription shares and did not concern those belonging to the South Sea Company. 
Carlos, Moyen and Hill (2002) conducted econometric analyses which established the 
existence of a close linear relationship between the values for Royal African 
subscription shares and their fully-paid counterparts. The objective in that paper was 
to explore the possible fundamental that was jointly driving the pair of Royal African 
share prices. Our objective here is wholly different. We wish to describe the 
mechanics of the Royal African subscription in 1720 in such a way to make clear why 
the linear dynamics discovered by Carlos et. al. appeared. The Royal African 
subscription had some features in common with the South Sea subscriptions shares, 
but they were different in very important ways and this will only become clear if a 
comparative study of the two Companies’ shares is undertaken. We shall see that it 
was the different financial management policies followed by the two companies that 
determined why in one set of markets the Royal African share values followed a joint 
linear process and in other markets the South Sea share values followed a distinctly 
joint nonlinear process. 
 
 
Royal African Company Subscription Shares 
 
The Royal African Company subscription share issue of 1720 arose from a 
capital enlargement scheme that was called an "engraftment". The engraftment was   9
first described very briefly, but quite accurately by DuBois (1938).
2 Our description 
of the details of the engraftment is more extensive than that given by DuBois, but we 
base our description on the same two important sources he used. The first is an 
indenture agreement between the Company and a group of trustees who would 
administer the engraftment. The scheme is completely described in this indenture 
agreement and, for citation purposes, we have reproduced it in full in Appendix 1.
3 
The second important source is a 1724 report by the trustees to the Company on the 
effects and management of the engraftment up to that point. For citation purposes 
again, this document is reproduced in full in Appendix 2.
4
The engraftment was devised by Joseph Taylor and several officers of the Royal 
African Company who are named in the indenture. The indenture agreement states 
that a new cash infusion was needed to remove a burden of debt and to reinvigorate 
the Company's trade (Appendix1, lines 5-10). The Royal African Company had a 
venerable, but vulnerable, position in the legally sanctioned transatlantic slave trade. 
After years of losses and deteriorating trading conditions caused by competitors and 
war (see Carlos and Kruse, 1996), it sought to refinance and revive its trade in the 
buoyant stock markets of early 1720. The new capital was to be in the form of equity 
and the new equity was to be offered to the public. The Company was seeking to more 
than quadruple the number of shares issued and outstanding; the new subscribers 
would end up owning more than 3 shares for every original share outstanding. This is 
a very important respect in which the Royal African subscription share issue was 
different from the South Sea subscription share issues; subscribers to the Royal 
African shares would end up owning more than 75 p.c. of the firm's equity, whereas 
                         
2 DuBois (1938), n.68, page 394. 
3 The indenture is found in the minutes of the General Court for the 
8 April, 1720. T70/101 Minutes of the General Court, 1678-1720 [page 
196 verso]. 
4 T70/115/199, Report of the Trustees of the Proprietors of the Old 
Stock, Submitted to the Committee of Accounts of the Royal African 
Company, April 30, 1724.   10
South Sea subscribers could never expect to own more than 15 p.c. of South Sea 
equity.
5 Everywhere in the Royal African indenture and in its execution, we shall see 
that the company took the utmost care in protecting original shareholder rights and 
wealth - in glaring contrast to the haphazard management exercised by the South Sea 
Company of its subscription issues. 
 
The Engraftment Defined 
The indenture makes the usual 18
th-Century distinction between assets ("stock") 
and equity claims on assets ("shares"). It first declares that the present stock is 
£430,000, which the Company would like to make up to £2 million. Original shares in 
stock number 4,304, to which they would like to add 15,696 new shares - making 
20,000 shares in all (A.1, lines 13-18). The original and newly engrafted capital will 
be assigned a new book value of £500,000. That is, each of the 20,000 shares will be 
rated at a value of £25 per share (p.s.) (A.1, lines 21-26). The subscribers will pay £25 
p.s. for their 15,696 shares, making £392,400 the total new cash to be received by the 
Company (A.1, lines 49-51).
6 The indenture states that the best estimated value for all 
original assets is £240,000 (A.1, lines 38-39),  but original shareholders will own only 
£107,600 of the £500,000 new book value, so they must be compensated £132,400 (= 
£240,000 - £107,600) out of the £392,400 paid by newly subscribing shareholders 
(A.1, lines 43-49). 
The uses to which this £132,400 are to be put are also described. It is to be split 
into two basic funds - £80,000 and £52,400. The £80,000 is for the discharge of a long 
list of enumerated debts amounting to as much as £75,696. This sum is to be delivered 
                         
5 Supplementary Appendix 1 (Shea, 2007b) contains an analysis of the 
size of the South Sea Company’s subscription share issues. 
6 By 1726 £387,967 had indeed been collected from subscribers (see 
T70/1186, Rough Drafts and Copy Book A [contra 142], "London April 
1726, An account of the several sums of money paid in originally and 
since the Company's establishment by subscriptions, calls or 
otherwise").   11
by Joseph Taylor to a group of the Company's officers within 21 days of the indenture 
agreement [7 April, 1720] who will settle and discharge the debts (A.1, lines 55-70). 
The residual £4,304 from the £80,000 is intended to be Joseph Taylor’s reward for 
devising and executing the scheme (A.1, lines 71-75). The other fund of £52,400 is to 
be delivered by Joseph Taylor to the Company by 1 December 1720 and it is to be put 
to two uses. If more debts are discovered or are undertaken by the original proprietors 
than can be paid for out of the £75,696 previously delivered to the Company, these 
debts will be paid out of the £52,400-fund. Secondly, once all such debts are satisfied, 
the residual of the £52,400 shall be distributed to the original proprietors in the form 
of a cash dividend up to £10 p.s. (A.1, lines 76-101). If the £52,400 are sufficient to 
pay all debts and to pay the maximum cash dividend of £10 p.s., then the residual can 
be used to compensate other Company officers for their efforts in administering the 
engraftment (A.1, lines 188-194). 
We know how some of the terms of indenture agreement worked out. At least 
we know how they worked out till the end of April 1724. Joseph Taylor got his 
£4,304 fee (A.2, lines 23-24), but the eventual debts of the Company were higher than 
at first expected and they were still awaiting payments on some subscription 
instalments (A.2, lines 21-22). The maximum £10 p.s. cash dividend was not realised 
and what original shareholders actually got was a little over £8 p.s. (A.2, lines 12-16). 
But the Royal African engraftment worked just about as planned: nearly the whole 
sums of monies projected to be raised, were raised; the costs of administering the 
engraftment were contained within the amounts budgeted and all old creditors to the 
company had been paid in full.  This was all accomplished in the difficult financial 
conditions that followed with the collapse of the South Sea scheme.   12
Provisions for Protecting Original Shareholder Wealth 
New shareholders had the chance to subscribe for new shares at a subscription 
price of £25 p.s. and these shares would eventually stand equal to fully-paid shares. At 
the time the indenture was drawn up (early April 1720), Royal African fully-paid 
shares were valued at about £63 p.s. That would have made original shareholder 
wealth (gross) 4,304×£63 ≅ £271,200 at that time. To this would be added £392,400 
from new shareholders, making total value of Royal African equity equal to £271,200 
+ £392,400 = £663,600. Spread over 20,000 shares this eventually would make the 
expected value of equity about £33 p.s.
7 We thus conclude that if there were no 
mechanisms in the engraftment scheme for the protection of original shareholders’ 
wealth,  their wealth would have declined by about £30 (= £63 - £33) p.s. 
The potential loss of £30 p.s. in shareholder wealth was precisely prevented by 
the terms of the indenture agreement. We do not know enough about the negotiations 
between Joseph Taylor and the Company's representatives to know how the 
mechanics of the scheme were determined, but we can surmise that the adjustment to 
book value of assets and the assignment of £240,000 to the value of original assets 
were numbers jointly chosen to avoid wealth losses to original shareholders. First, 
new shareholders directly relieved original shareholders of £75,696 in debts. This 
relief was worth about £18 p.s. Secondly, original shareholders were also given the 
fund of £52,400 (or about £12 p.s.) that could be used to either relieve them of any 
further debts or to pay a cash dividend up to £10 p.s. So, altogether these two funds 
did deliver the approximate £30 p.s. compensation to original shareholders. The 
indenture agreement, of course, also had to work well and completely or else original 
shareholders would lose. For example, Joseph Taylor was responsible for delivering 
                         
7 To be precise, the expected diluted share value would be calculated 
simply as,  4 . 33 £
000 , 20
25 £ 696 , 15
000 , 20





 p.s.   13
funds to the Company's officers in full and in a timely fashion. If for any reason he 
failed in these tasks, the original shareholders would be the losers. We shall now look 
at some more features of the indenture agreement to see how these problems were 
overcome. 
 
Making the Indenture Work – the Role of Underpricing 
The indenture agreement was clearly designed to maximise the chances that all 
its terms would be fulfilled. Joseph Taylor was allowed to collect subscriptions for 
new shares (A.1, lines 142-150). We do not know how he allocated new shares, but 
the offer terms were clearly designed to make sure the subscription would be filled. 
The task facing Mr. Taylor was to define a group of people who could subscribe for 
shares which, we have already calculated, would have an expected market value of 
about £33 p.s. These persons would have rights to these shares by paying the special 
price (the rights price) defined in the indenture agreement. By setting the rights price 
(£25 p.s.) to a number well below the expected value of shares, the writers of the 
indenture made sure that Mr. Taylor’s solicitation of subscriptions would be easy. The 
second set of features of the subscription shares that would have made them popular is 
that they were issued in small denominations and in large numbers. 
The indenture states that the original tranche of £75,696 along with another sum 
of £45,568 would be very soon delivered after the indenture was agreed. These 
payments would together amount to £8 per new share. In other words, the indenture 
stipulated that a £8 per new share deposit would very quickly be made to the 
Company (A.1, lines 102-116). Further instalments collected by Mr. Taylor would be 
due on or before 1 June (£5 per new share), 1 September (£5 per new share) and 1 
December (£7 per new share) (A.1, lines 117-131). Relatively small instalments due 
from Mr. Taylor put relatively little pressure on the numerous subscribers in paying   14
their instalments. Finally, the indenture tried to define the company's rights to reclaim 
subscription shares and instalments already paid in the event of default on subsequent 
instalments (A.1, lines 162-171). 
For a chartered company such as the Royal African, there was always the 
question of what actions and relations were legal if they were not explicitly mentioned 
in the Company's charter. The passage of the Bubble Act (6 Geo.1, c.18) in May 1720 
made this problem more acute. The Royal African Company was chartered before 
1718 and would have thus have been relieved of many of the strictures of the Bubble 
Act, but the Act stated, with strong emphasis, that chartered companies had to operate 
strictly within the confines of its charter. Given the hostility that the South Sea 
Company displayed towards other competing enterprises that were raising capital via 
subscriptions in 1720, it is not surprising that the Royal African was as careful as it 
was in defining its relations with its subscribers.
8
 
Analysing the Market Values for Royal African Subscription Shares 
How can we assume that subscribers to subscription shares did not value the 
possible right to defaulting upon promised subscription instalments? It is apparent that 
such rights had substantial value in the case of South Sea subscription shares.
9 In 
November 1720 the Royal African Company even altered the terms of the instalment 
schedule on its subscription shares in order to forestall defaults.
 10 It thus would have 
been reasonable to wonder if there was some default option value embedded in the 
                         
8 Again, the contrast with the South Sea Company is instructive. The 
Bubble Act itself on silent on most of the important aspects of the 
Company's relations with subscribers. Whilst it allowed for an easy 
transfer of subscription receipts, it said nothing about the 
Company’s duties in facilitating that trade or what would happen if 
either subscribers or the Company did not fulfil their obligations 
under the subscriptions. 
9 Shea (2007a) makes the historical argument for the existence of 
these rights and Shea (2007b) explicitly models their values. 
10 18 Nov 1720, T70/90, Minute Book of the Court of Assistants, pages 
131-2.   15
subscription share values. The fact that the new shares were being issued at below 
book value was of no concern to original shareholders as long as their original wealth 
was at least preserved. This was done by the arrangements we have described. But 
this still leaves open the question as to how the value of the subscription shares should 
subsequently have been related to the value of original shares. 
Our analytical approach to understanding the prices of Royal African 
subscription shares uses a simple graphical device, which provides a direct measure of 
the value of an option to default upon subscription instalments. It is a graphical 
depiction of what can be called an arbitrage bound and it is complicated only by the 
existence of the uncertain dividend that was promised to original shareholders in the 
indenture agreement. We first pose a counterfactual situation in which the 
subscription shares were simply fractional claims upon ex-dividend fully-paid shares. 
To take an example, compare the value of subscription shares and fully-paid shares on 
1 June, 1720. On that date a £5 instalment was due on the subscription shares, but 
there were still to be paid another £5 (due 1 September) and a final £7 (due 1 
December). We suppose therefore that on 2 June a subscription share would represent 
a fractional (£13/£25) claim on a fully-paid share that was shorn of its expected 
dividend; the value of that would be (£13/£25)×(Pfully-paid - PV[£10]).
11 From this 
quantity we can construct an arbitrage lower bound on subscription share values and 
will argue that this bound would have to be obeyed, thus 
 
(£13/£25)×(Pfully-paid - PV[£10]) + PV(instalments) ≥ Pfully-paid . 
 
If the bound was not obeyed, anyone who could buy a subscription share and 
borrow the present value of the remaining instalments would be able to obtain the   16
equivalent of an original share at a cost smaller than that demanded in the market for 
original shares. If the bound appeared to be exactly binding, then we would have to 
conclude there was no possible value in the subscription shares attributable to a 
default option on instalments. In the figure below we depict the value quotations for 
African ex-dividend original shares and subscription shares plus the present value of 


































































































African ex-div (10%) Share Price Subscription + PV Calls
PV Calls
 
We can perhaps just persuade ourselves that the subscription shares have a 
slightly greater value than they should have if they did not contain default option 
values. This added value appears clearly only after late September and can perhaps be 
discerned in the middle of June as well. But if that added value is actually there, it is 
certainly very small. We must not forget, however, that in contemporary minds there 
                                                                        
11 We here assume momentarily that the promised £10 dividend was also 
the expected dividend. 
12 The present value of the instalments takes a slight step on 18 
November (not perceptible in the graph) when the Company announced 
that only £4 would be due 1 December and not £7. The present value of 
the remaining £3 was calculated upon the assumption that it would not   17
was likely to be some confusion as to what an ex-dividend original African share 
would actually turn out to be. The expected dividend payout to original shareholders 
may well have been different from the promised £10 and was likely to be lower. This 
could happen because the Company could discover or incur additional debt 
obligations (this did happen) or because the subscription issue itself would fail to 
collect sufficient instalment payments to sufficiently fill the £52,400-trust fund out of 
which cash dividends would be paid (this did not happen). In one way or another, the 
definition of an ex-dividend share was uncertain. 
Incorporating a little of that uncertainty into our picture above removes all doubt 
that the Royal African subscription shares did not contain default option values. The 
actual ex-post dividend paid to shareholders was a longer delayed approximate £8 
dividend. If that could have been foreseen, then contemporaries could have persuaded 
themselves that ex-dividend original shares were a few pounds more valuable than we 
have depicted them above. The picture, modified for an expected 8% dividend, would 
be like the one below. 
                                                                        
be due until 21 March 1721, which was the assumption made by Carlos 

































































































African ex-div (8%) Share Price Subscription + PV Calls
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There is apparent not only the almost perfect correlation between original and 
subscription share values (noted by Carlos et. al.), but there is also almost no 
difference in the level of the respective share values. There is no suggestion of a 
noticeable default option value component to the subscription share values. This 
picture also makes it appear that the prices for subscription shares contained within 
them a very accurate forecast of the size that the promised dividend of 1721 would 
take. Unlike the South Sea subscription shares, any options to default on instalments 
in the Royal African shares were far out of the money and therefore worthless. There 
was no likely future collapse in Royal African asset or share values that would make 
such defaults attractive. 
 
South Sea Company Subscription Shares 
At the probable height of equity values in late June 1720, subscription shares 
accounted for at least 10 percent of all South Sea Company equity value and could 
have eventually accounted for 15 percent of all South Sea equity. They were issued to   19
meet the immediate cash needs of the firm. Some of the cash would have had to be 
used in the exchange packages the Company was offering to government annuitants, 
but by far the largest use of the cash was in the form of loans to shareholders who 
were pledging their shares as collateral for loans.
13
The subscription shares were shares issued to the public and they could be 
purchased in instalments.
14 The 1
st Subscription series started 14
th April 1720 and the 
2
nd series started soon thereafter. The 1
st Subscription, for example, was for shares 
priced at £300 per share (p.s.). A £60 deposit was required and thereafter every two 
months a 10 percent or £30 instalment would be called. The 1
st Subscription shares 
had a £30 call upon them due to be paid on 14
th June.  On that date the possession of a 
subscription share would represent 30 p.c. of an original share and the obligation or 
right to make 7 more bi-monthly instalments of £30 each until ownership in one full 
original share resulted. The 2
nd Subscription required a 10 p.c. deposit on a share 
priced at £400. After the first £40 deposit, a further 9 £40 quarterly instalments would 
follow. The 3
rd Subscription did not commence until 17 June and required a £100 
deposit on a share that was to be priced at £1000. Nine further semi-annual 
instalments of £100 each would be required before a fully-paid share was credited to 
the owner.
15 The 4
th subscription did not commence until 12 August and it too was 
priced at £1000 p.s. 
The issue prices for subscription shares were at the level or slightly above the values 
for fully-paid shares at their respective dates of issue. The consequence of this is that, 
                         
13 In Add. Ms. 25,499, South Sea Company. Court Minutes No. 6, page 
104, for 21 April 1720 we have one of the more remarkable statements 
from the directors of the Company concerning their intended financial 
management of the firm. The disposition of cash from the sale of 
subscription shares figures prominently in their statements. 
14 The 18
th and 19
th century usage of the term "call" often refers to a 
request for the payment from either a subscriber or an existing 
shareholder. That is how we shall use the term in this paper and not 
as reference to a call option. 
15 A history of the instalment schedules for these shares is found in 
Supplementary Appendix 3 (Shea, 2007a).   20
throughout most of the subscription shares’ subsequent trading lives, South Sea fully-
paid share prices were actually very low relative to the subscription prices. This was 
quite different from the situation for the Royal African subscription shares, whose 
issue price was set much lower than the fully-paid shares’ price at the time of issue. 
Another significant way in which the South Sea subscriptions differed from those of 
the Royal African Company was in their rights to dividends. Nearly from the 
beginning of their issue, the South Sea Company declared that subscription shares 
would share in any dividends equally with fully-paid shares. Table 1 summarises the 
salient differences between the South Sea Company’s and the Royal African 
Company’s subscription shares that we have noted so far. 
 
Table 1           Some Comparative Features of Royal African and South Sea Subscription Shares in 1720 










Date of Issue  21 April 1720  14 April 1720  17 April 1720  17 June 1720  12 August 1720 
Issue Price  £25 p.s.  £300 p.s.  £400 p.s.  £1000 p.s.  £1000 p.s. 
Fully-Paid Share 

































share in equity 





Rights to Dividends?  No.  Yes. 
An arbitrage bound on South Sea share values can be constructed much as we 
have done for the Royal African Company shares. The present value of the 
subscription shares’ instalments or calls (PVcalls), when added to the market price of 
subscription shares themselves, should clearly exceed the value of fully-paid shares. 
The arbitrage argument follows as before; if the fully-paid share values exceed this 
sum, then profitable arbitrage would exist and persons could obtain fully-paid shares   21
at a lower than market cost by simply purchasing a subscription share and by paying 
the present value of all the remaining instalments. We have derived and discussed this 
bound in our previous two papers, so it will suffice here to illustrate it in the context 
of only one of the South Sea subscription share issues – the 1
st issue. The bound 
Psubscription share + PVcalls ≥ Pfully-paid should not be breached and the figure below clearly 
shows that it is not. It shows as well the substantial option value of default that was 

































































South Sea Share Price 1st Subscrip. + PV Calls
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The option to default is a put option, but we have not tried to model directly its 
value. The principle of put-call parity, however, does state that when we have a put 
option, we can define a corresponding call option that has the same exercise price as 
the put, whose value is directly calculable from the value of the put. It is that 
corresponding call option whose values we have successfully modelled and estimated 
in our previous work (Shea, 2007b). The call option is identified with the South Sea 
subscription shares themselves, which we have modelled as compound call options. It   22
is on the basis of the success we have had in modelling the values of the South Sea 
subscription shares with the compound call option model that allows us to conclude 
that we have also successfully explained the value of the default/put option possessed 
by South Sea subscription shares. 
 
Conclusions 
Textbook exercises in corporate finance show the student the many ways in which 
new equity can be raised in efficient markets without any adverse effects upon 
original shareholders’ wealth. A good example is the issue of shares by rights to 
original shareholders. It makes no difference what the rights price is, whether it is 
above market value or book value of shares, the effects of the rights issue are always 
wealth-neutral because the firm’s equity remains 100 percent-owned by the original 
shareholders.
16 The problem of the refinancing of the Royal African Company in 1720 
was that its original owners were not numerous enough nor wealthy enough to provide 
the four-fold expansion in equity that was required by the firm’s management. The 
Royal African’s solution to this problem was the issue of an innovated security that 
was priced and managed in ways that allowed it to be sold to such large numbers of 
new capitalists so that it could raise a fund to compensate original shareholders for the 
foreseeable declines in the value of their shares. The new equity raised was 
transparently applied to extinguish debts and to make a cash payout to original 
shareholders so that their wealth was unaffected and, most importantly, could be 
foreseen to be unaffected. The result was that an easy-to-understand arbitrage 
relationship between original shares and the innovated subscription shares was 
established. The evidence shows that any profitable arbitrage opportunities were 
efficiently extinguished in the stock markets of 1720. A close modern parallel to the   23
Royal African case is the efficient arbitrage between fully-paid shares and instalment 
receipts found in many Commonwealth countries today (see Pinder, 1998 and 
Charupat and Prisman, 2004). 
In the South Sea Company’s case the innovated securities, the subscription 
shares, had a bit different design and were certainly applied to very different uses than 
were the Royal African subscription shares. Yet the evidence shows that these 
securities were also the objects of no less efficient arbitrage than were the Royal 
African subscription shares. The South Sea subscription shares fall somewhere 
between modern instalment receipts and the shares of modern no-liability (NL) 
mining companies (Morris, 1997). In the pricing of modern instalment receipts there 
is a detectable cost to preventing default, but it is very small. The largest component 
of any premium that is commanded by modern instalment receipts stems from the 
leverage they embody for any investor who might be credit-constrained (Charupat and 
Prisman 2004). It appears that South Sea subscription shares were similarly attractive 
to credit-constrained investors (Shea 2007a). But unlike modern instalment receipts, 
the costs of preventing instalment defaults on South Sea subscription shares were 
huge. In this way they were more like instalment shares in NL mining companies, for 
which there is no provision for the prevention of default (Morris 1997). Because the 
South Sea Company set issue prices so very high relative to the market value of fully-
paid shares, the default option contained within their subscription shares became quite 
valuable. Yet it appears that these options too were adequately valued so that no 
profitable arbitrage opportunities arose between South Sea subscription shares and 
fully-paid shares. 
We conclude that the best evidence collectible on arbitrage in 1720 suggests 
that, upon a comparison of two distinct, but related markets for innovated securities, 
                                                                        
16 Brealey and Myers (2006) is but a typical textbook containing such 
exercises.    24
the stock markets were efficient. This does not say that we have identified an 
intertemporal fundamental that was driving the South Sea Bubble, not does it say that 
we have indirect evidence that such a fundamental was being efficiently priced. But it 
does say that at least a simple form of market efficiency was present and made sure 





Additional Manuscripts, British Library (Add. Ms.). 
 
Treasury Papers, Class T70, National Archives (NA Kew). 
 
Papers of the Committee of Secrecy, Parchment Collection, House of Lords Record 
Office (HLRO). 
 
The Course of the Exchange, issues published by John Castaing, 1720. 
 
The Price of Several Stocks etc., issues published by John Freke, 1720-21. 
 
Altorfer, Stefan, “The Canton of Berne as an Investor on the London Capital Market 
in the 18th
 
Century,” working paper, Department of Economic History, London 
School of Economics, 2004. 
 
Brealey, R.A. and Myers, S.C., 2006. Principles of Corporate Finance. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2006). 
 
Carlos, Ann M. and Kruse, Jamie Brown, “The decline of the Royal African 
Company: fringe firms and the role of the charter,” Economic History Review 49 
(1996), 291-313. 
 
Carlos, Ann M., Moyen, Nathalie and Hill, Jonathan, “Royal African Company Share 
Prices during the South Sea Bubble," Explorations in Economic History, 39 (2002), 
61-87. 
 
Charupat, N. and Prisman, E.Z., "An Essay on Financial Innovation: The Case of 
Instalment Receipts,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28 (2004), 129-156. 
 
Dale, Richard S., Johnson, Johnnie E.V., and Tang, L., “Financial markets can go 
mad: evidence of irrational behaviour during the South Sea Bubble,” Economic 
History Review, 58 (2005), 233-71. 
 
DuBois, Armand Budington, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 
1720-1800 (Columbia University Press, 1938, reprinted New York: Octagon Books, 
1971).   25
Neal, Larry, 1994. "For God's Sake, Remitt me": The adventures of George 
Middleton, John Law's London goldsmith-banker, 1712-1729. Business and 
Economic History 23, 27-60. 
 
_________, 2000. The money Pitt: Lord Londonderry and the South Sea Bubble; or, 
how to manage risk in an emerging market. Enterprise & Society 1, 659-674. 
 
Murphy, Antoin E., Richard Cantillon: Entrepreneur and Economist (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986). 
 
Pinder, S.M., “The relative pricing of Commonwealth Bank shares and instalment 
receipts,” Accounting Research Journal, 11 (1998), 293-296. 
 
Shea, Gary S., “Financial market analysis can go mad (in the search for irrational 
behaviour during the South Sea Bubble),” forthcoming Economic History Review, 60 
(2007a). 
 
Shea, Gary S., “Understanding financial derivatives during the South Sea Bubble: the 
case of the South Sea subscription shares,” Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (2007b), 73-
104, doi:10.1093/oep/gpm031. 
 
Shleifer, A., 2000. Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Temin, Peter and Voth, Hans-Joachim, "Riding the South Sea Bubble," American 
Economic Review, 94 (2004), 1654-68. 
   26
Appendix 1 
 
T70/101 Minutes of the General Court  1678-1720 
 




l Court of y.
e 8.
th of Aprill 1720 Continued 
 
Then the Indenture of Agreement was read under the Common Seal of this 
Company made the Seventh day of this Instant Aprill between the Company of one 
part and the said Joseph Taylor of the other part as follows. Viz.
t
 
This Indenture made the Seventh day of Aprill in the Sixth Year of the Reign of Our 
Sovereign Lord George by the Grace of God of Great Britain - France and Ireland 
King Defender of the faith cr(?) Anno. Dom. 1720. Between the Royall African 
























n of the other 
part  Whereas by reason of many Losses sustained by the said Company during the 
late Warrs and other Casualtys the Stock of the said Company hath been so Impaired 
that after payment of their just Debts there would not remaine Sufficient for carrying 
on the Trade to Africa And Whereas the said Company are greatly desirous that all 
their Debts may be speedily and fully satisfied and that there may be a sufficient clear 
Stock made up for carrying on the said Trade in its utmost Extent the said Company 
Have for that purpose Agreed with the said Joseph Taylor And it is by these presents 
agreed by and between the said Company and the said Joseph Taylor as follows viz. 
That the present Capitall Stock of the said Company being Four hundred Thirty 
Thousand and four hundred pounds [page 197] or Four Thousand three hundred and 
four Shares shall be made up two Millions or Twenty Thousand Shares by Ingraftm.
t 
or addition of the sume of One Million five hundred Sixty nine Thousand Six 
hundred pounds new Stock or Fifteen Thousand Six hundred and ninety Six new 
Shares which said new Stock or fifteen Thousand Six hundred and ninety Six new 
Shares is and are hereby Created and Added to the said present Capitall Stock or four 
thousand three hundred and four Old Shares and make up the said two Millions or 
Twenty Thousand Shares And That upon the said Ingraftment the Dead and Quick 
Stock to be used and imployed in and for the immediate carrying on of the said Trade 
shall be made up Five hundred thousand pounds in such manner as is hereafter sett   27
forth which is after the rate of Twenty Five pounds for and in respect of each Share or 
one hundred pound Stock of and in the said Capitall Stock of Two Millions and 
according to that rate the proportion to be Continued in the said Trade for and in 
Respect of the said Four thousand Three hundred and four Old Shares amounts to 
One hundred Seven thousand Six hundred pounds and the proportion to be made 
good for and in Respect of the said fifteen thousand Six hundred and Ninety Six new 
Shares amounts to Three hundred ninety two thousand and four hundred pounds 
[page 197 verso] And that the propriety of all the Countrys Dominions Lands 



































all Forts Factorys and Settlements and all Stores Aminition furniture Castle Slaves 
and other materialls and things commonly reported or called the Dead Stock of the 
said Company shall be Estimated at Two Hundred Thousand pounds and the present 
Quick Stock of the said Company consisting of Goods Merchandize Shipping & 
Debts oweing to the said Company in England Africa and the plantations and 
elsewhere shall be Estimated at Forty Thousand pounds making together two hundred 
and forty thousand which is hereby agreed to be the Value of the present Quick and 
Dead Stock belonging to the Proprietors of the said four Thousand three hundred and 
four Old Shares and is agreed from henceforth to belong to the Proprietors of the said 
Two Millions or Twenty thousand shares which said Sume of Two hundred and forty 
thousand pounds being One hundred Thirty two Thousand four hundred pounds 
above the said Sume of One hundred Seven Thousand and Six hundred pounds the 
proportion to be continued in the said Trade for and in [page 198] respect of the said 
Four thousand three hundred and four Old Shares as aforesaid the sume of One 
hundred Thirty two thousand four hundred pounds is to be paid or satisfied in such 
manner as is hereinafter mentioned to or for y.
e Use or benefit of the said Proprietors 
of the said four thousand three hundred and four Old Shares by and out of the said 
Sume of Three hundred ninety two thousand four hundred pounds which is to be paid 
for and in respect of the said Fifteen thousand Six hundred & ninety Six new Shares 
as is also hereinafter mentioned And That the Sume of Eighty Thousand pounds 
part of the said Sume of One hundred thirty two Thousand four hundred pounds to be 
paid or made good to or for the Use or benefit of the said proprietors of the said Old 
Shares as aforesaid shall be paid or satisfied as followeth (that is to say) the Sume of 
Seventy five thousand Six hundred and ninety Six pounds part of the said Sume of   28
Eighty Thousand pounds shall be paid by the said Joseph Taylor to Henry Neale 


































d Lockwood of London Esq.
s and Jacob 
Watchter of London Merchant within one and twenty daies next after the day of the 
date of the presents upon Trust [page 198 verso] That the said to Henry Neale James 
Blake Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter and the Survivor 
& Survivors of them & the Exec.
s and Administ.
s of such Survivors shall forthwith 
pay over and apply the same towards discharge of the debts now due from the said 
Company in England and particularly mentioned in a Schedule hereunto Annexed & 
procure Sufficient Releases or discharges of the said Debts and deliver the same to 
the Court of Assistants of the said Company and the said Henry Neale James Blake 
Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter and the Survivors & 
Survivor of them and the Exec.
s and Administ.
s of such Survivor is and are hereby 
impower'd to settle and adjust such of the said Debts as are not yet adjusted and 
thereupon to pay the Same and take Releases or Discharges and deliver over the same 
as aforesaid And the Sume of £4,,304,, residue of the s.
d Sume of £80,,000,, shall be 
deducted and retained by the said Joseph Taylor for his own Use and benefitt in full 
Satisfaction as well of all the Costs Charges and Expences the said Joseph Taylor has 
been put to as in [page 199] Recompense for the Great Pains and trouble he hath 
taken and undergone in Setting on foot carrying on and perfecting this Agreement 
And That the sume of Fifty Two Thousand  four hundred pounds residue of the said 
sume of One hundred Thirty Two Thousand four hundred pounds shall be paid by the 
Court of Assist.
s of the said Company for the time being to the said Henry Neale 
James Blake Andrews Hopegood Rich.
d Lockwood and Jacob Watchter or the 
Survivors or Survivor of them or the Exec.
s or Administ.
s of such Survivor out of the 
Sume of £109,,872 hereinafter mentioned to be paid to the Court of Assistants on the 
1.
st day of Dec.
r next Ensueing the date of these Presents Upon Trust That if any 
further debts now due from the said Company in England and not mentioned in the 
said Schedule shall within the Space of One Year from the day of the date of these 
presents appear to remain unsatisfied then the said Henry Neale James Blake 
Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter and the Survivors and 
Survivor of them and the Executors and Administrators of such Survivor shall pay 
and Satisfie such debts out of the said Sume of £52,400 and take sufficient Releases 
[page 199 verso] or discharges for the same and deliver such Releases and discharges   29
to the Court of Assistants of the said Company which s.
d further Debts the said Henry 
Neale James Blake Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter and 
the Survivors and Survivor of them and the Executors and Administrators of such 
Survivor is and are hereby also impower'd to Settle and adjust and after Satisfaction 


































d Sume of 
£52,400 for the said intire Sume of £52,400 in case no such further Debts shall appear 
together with the Surplus of the said Sume of £75,,696 if any Surplus there shall be 
after payment of the said Debts to and amongst such as at the Closing of the 




assistants shall appear to be ?? Proprietors of the said £430,400 Old Stock or 4,304 
Old Shares or their respective Exec.
s Adm.s or Assignes ratable and in proportion to 
their Severall and Respective Interests of and in the said Old Stock or Shares And it 
is further agreed that the said sume of £392,,400 [page 200] New Shares as afores.
d 
shall be paid or Satisfied by af.
d Jos Taylor or his Ass.
s in manner following that is to 
Say the said sume of £4304 being the proportion to be made good for and in Respect 
of the said £15,,696 part of the said Sume of £80,,000 being deducted and retained to 
himselfe as aforesaid and the Sume of £75,,696 pounds residue of the said Sume of 
£80,,000 being paid by the said Joseph Taylor to the said Henry Neale James Blake 
Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter  In Trust as aforesaid 
the further Sume of £45,,568 pounds shall be also paid by the said Joseph Taylor 
within Three dayes next after a New Choice of Sub Gov.
r Dep.
t Gov.
r and Assistants 
shall be made as is hereinafter mentioned unto Such Court of Assistants to and for the 
Use of the said Company and to be Imployed towards carrying on of the said Trade 
w.
ch said Two Sumes of £80,000 and forty five Thousand five Hundred Sixty Eight 
pounds make the Sume of One Hundred Twenty five Thousand five hundred Sixty 
Eight pounds which is after the rate of Eight pounds part of the said Twenty five 
pounds to be paid for and in respect of each Share, or one hundred pounds Stock of 
the s.
d 15,696 new Shares or £1,569,600 new Stock and the Sume of [page 200 verso] 
£266,832,, residue of the said Sume of £392,400 shall be paid by the said Joseph 
Taylor or his respective Assignes in Proportion to Each of their respective Shares or 
Interests in the said New Stock of £1,569,600, or 15,,696 new Shares to the Court of 
Assistants of the said Company for the time being in manner following (that is to say) 
the Sume of £78,480 part thereof being after the rate of five pounds for and in   30
Respect of each Share of the said 15,696 new Shares on or before the first day of June 
now next ensuing £78,480 more thereof (being also after the rate of  £5 p Share) on or 


































r now next ensuing and £109,872, residue of the said 
£266,832, (being after the rate of Seven pounds per Share) to make up the said 
Twenty five pounds per Share on or before the first day of Decemb.
r now next 
ensuing out of which said last mentioned Sume of £109,872 the Court of the 
Assistants of the said Company shall pay the said Sume of £52,400 to the said Henry 
Neale James Blake [page 201] Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob 
Watchter or the Survivors or Survivor of them or the Executors or Administrators of 
such Survivor In Trust as aforesaid and in full Satisfaction of the said Sume of 
£132,400 to be made good to the said Proprietors of the said 4,304 Old Shares as 
aforesaid And the s.
d Sume of £132,400 being so paid and made good to or for the 
Use or benefitt of the said Proprietors of the said 4,304 Old Shares out of the said 
Sume of £392,400 as aforesaid and being deducted from the said Sume of £39,400 
there will remain the Sume of £260,000 to and for the use of the said Company which 
being added to the said Sume of £240,000 the Value of the present Dead and Quick 
Stock of the s.
d Company as aforesaid makes up the said Sume of £500,000 intended 
to be Used and Imployed in and for the imediate carrying on of the said Trade as 
aforesaid And it is hereby further agreed by and between the said Company and the 
said Joseph Taylor That upon Payment of the said Sume of £75,696 by y.
e s.
d [page 
201 verso] Joseph Taylor to the said Henry Neale James Blake [page 201] Andrews 
Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter within One and Twenty days now 
next Ensuing as aforesaid The said £1,569,600 new Stock or fifteen Thousand Six 
hundred & Ninety Six New Shares hereby Created as aforesaid shall be and the Same 
is and are hereby agreed to be from henceforth vested in the s.
d Joseph Taylor and the 
said Joseph Taylor shall have Creditt for the Same in the said Company Books the 
better to Enable him to transfer the same in Books to be prepared for that Purpose to 
Such person and persons and in such proportions as he shall think fitt Subject and 
Lyable to such further paym.
t in respect of each Share as aforesaid or in default of 
such Payments to such forfeiture as is hereinafter mentioned for which Transfers so 
to be made by the said Joseph Taylor the Cost of the Stamps only shall be paid by y.
e 
person who shall Accept the said Stock [page 202] And That y.
e person or persons 
to whome the s.
d Joseph Taylor shall Assigne or Transfer any of the said £1,569,600   31
new Stock or 15,696 new Shares as aforesaid shall upon their respective acceptance 
thereof be admitted into the freedome of the said Company (taking the usual Oath) 


































r or Assistant if qualified by having Creditt for so much Stock as is Requisite for 
those respective purposes according to the By Laws of the said Company Provided 
nevertheless and it is hereby agreed that of default shall happen to be made of or in 
payment of any of the s.
d Subsequent Payments of £5, £5, & £7 per Share as aforesaid 
or any part thereof at any of the respective times herein before Limited for Paym.
t 
thereof Then and in such case the respective Share and Shares only wherein or in 
respect of which such default shall happen to be made and all such moneys as shall 
have been paid to y.
e s.
d Company upon Account of such Share and Shares [page 202 
verso] Respectively shall be and remain forfeited to and for the benefitt of the said 
Company And the person & persons so making default shall from henceforth forfeit 




r and Each Member of the present Court of 
Assistants shall at any time or times after payment of the said Sume of Seventy five 
thousand Six hundred ninety Six pounds by the said Joseph Taylor to the said Henry 
Neale James Blake Andrews Hopegood Richard Lockwood and Jacob Watchter as 
aforesaid upon the request of the said Joseph Taylor disqualify themselves 
respectively to hold the s.
d Respective Offices so as that new Elections may form 
time to time be made by the Gen.
l Court of the Proprietors of the said Capitall Stock 
of £2,000,000 or Twenty Thousand Shares according to the method prescribed by the 
said Companys Charter to Supply such Vacancys as shall be made by such 
disqualifications and [page 203] fill up the said Court of Assistants In Witness 
whereof to one part of these presents The said Royal African Company of England 
have caused their Comon Seale to be put and to the other part of these presents the 
said Joseph Taylor hath sett his hand and Seal the day and year first above written.  32
{There then follows a schedule of the Company's debts to the end of page 204. Then 
on page 204 verso the concluding text resumes.} 
 
Whereupon It is ordered Nemine Contradicente that the Thanks of this Court be 













r Joseph Taylor and bring the Same to a happy Conclusion. 
 
And it is Order'd that the said Sume of £9,360 residue of the said Sume of £52,400 or 
so much thereof as shall remain after Satisfaction of the said Sume of £43,040, as 
aforesaid shall be paid by the said Trustees to the said Henry Neale Esq.
r Andrew 
Hopegood Esq.
r and Robert Wood D.L.L. as a Compensation for their pains and 
Trouble in Negotiating and perfecting the Agreement with the said M.
r Joseph Taylor 
and to Enable them to gratifye such Persons as in their Judjment have been servicable 
to the Company in such manner as they in their discretions shall think fitt.   33
Appendix 2 
 
T70/115/199, Report of the Trustees of the Proprietors of the Old Stock, Submitted to 




At a Committee of Accounts Thursday April 30 1724 
 
Pursuant to an Order of the Court of Assistants of the 27 day of June last to Us 
the Committee of Accounts to Examine the accounts of the Trustees for the Old 
Proprietors and to Report how far we find the said Trust has been perform’d, and 
what remains to be done to Compleat the Performance thereof------ 
 
{A lengthy précis of the Indenture Agreement described in Appendix 1 then follows to 
the bottom of page 121 verso, which is then followed by} 
 
And We have examined the accounts of the Trustees which they have laid 
before us in a Book mark’d A containing forty Pages and Intitled 
[page 122] 
 
The Account of Henry Neale, James Blake, Andrew Hopegood, 











rs and Jacob Wachter Merch.
t , of 
their application and payment, and also of what remains unpaid of the 
moneys received by them; in pursuance of an Indenture dated 7
th April 
1720, made between the Royal African Company of England, and 
Joseph Taylor of London Gentleman upon the trust therein 
mention’d……. 
Whereby We find they have charged themselves with the said 
Sum of £75,696 in account of Cash received of the said Mr. Taylor
pursuant to the said Indenture of Agreement  £„75,696  34





1,555„18„3  And with the sum of £35,595„7„11 for Dividend Warrants 
653„14  Paid by the Company to Sundry Proprietors of Old Stock, the 
     105       Particulars whereof are set forth in the said Book A page 14  15 
16  35,595„7„11  to page 40 inclusive…………………………..£35,595„7„11 
      17 






So that the whole sum receiv'd by the said Trustees is…..  121,091„7„11 
And there remains unpaid by the Company to compleat the 
said £52,400 the sum of…..  7,004„12„1 
Which with the sum retain'd by Mr. Taylor pursuant to 
the said Indenture of Agreement being  4,304   24 
25 
26 
     
Makes up the Sum mentioned in the said Agreement to 










And in Discharge of the said Sum of £121,091„7„11 so received by the 
said Trustees as aforesaid Wee find by their said accounts that 
towards satisfaction of the said Debts mentioned in the Schedule 
annex'd to the said Indenture of Agreement which with Interest 
amounted to £75,359„…„10 3/4 
They have paid several sums the Particulars whereof are set forth in the said Book 
Mark'd A page 1 to 4 inclusive….  £71,427„9„2 3/4






   71,458„…„2  3/4
And to several Proprietors of the said 4,304 old shares for their Dividend of £10 p 
Cent thereon, the Particulars whereof are set forth in the said Book Mark'd A 
[page 123] page 14 to page 40 inclusive    £35,395„7„11 
and to Mr Neale, Mr Hopegood, and Dr Wood pursuant to 
the said Order of the General Court        9,360             42 
     44,755„7„11  43   35
 The several Sums so paid by the Trustees amount to…  116,213„8„1 3/4  44 
And they are to pay the company for Balance of their Account..    4,877„19„9 1/4 45 
And that makes up the sum wherewith the Trustees stand charged being…  £121,091„7„11 46 
47 
48 
Which sum to be paid by the Trustees to the Co. viz
t. the sum of  £4,877„19„9 1/4 
being added to the Sum the Co. have paid short of the 
£52,400 to the Trustees which is….  £7,004„12„1 49 















Which is for the following accounts viz
t. 
Of the Debts mentioned in the Schedule annexed to the said Indenture of Agreement 
computed at £73,463„1„10 and amounting with Interest to £75,359„…„10 3/4 there 
are several which have not been called for and it is doubtful whether all of them are 
due, but if they should be demanded and made out, the Company is answerable for 
'em the Particulars whereof appear in the said Book Mark'd A Page 1 to pa: 4 
Inclusive & amount to…..  £3,481„11„8 
And there are three Sums amounting to £450 charged as Debts which upon 
Examination were found to be owing viz
t. 
Lent ni 1718 to be paid in Guinea…  £200 
Borrowed of Mr. Richard Mead ni 1719  200 
Due to Several Persons on the Loan £50,000 w
ch. 




And the forementioned Sums amounting to  £3,931„11„8 
And what the Trustees paid on Account of 
the Debts in the said Schedule being   71,427„9„2 3/4 
and for Charges in Execution of the Trust….      30„11  68 
69  making together……………………….  75,389„11„10 3/4 
fall short by……………………………      306„8„1 1/4  70 





Which the Trustees receiv'd of Mr Taylor, and therefore there remains 
for the use of the Company that Sum of ………………………    £306„8„1 1/4 
And as the Trustees have charged the Sum of  £43,040 
the Amount of the Dividend of £10 p. Cent on 
the Old Stock no more paid than…….  35,395„7„11  76 
77  there remaining   7,644„12„1 which   £4,237„19„9 1/4   36
[page 124]  78 
79  Which the Company is to pay when demanded the particulars whereof are 
in the s
d. Book Mark'd A page 1 to 40 inclusive….    7,644„12„1  80 















And upon Examination Wee find that Discharges as well for the said Debts paid 
By the Trustees amounting to £71,427„9„2 3/4 as also for the s
d. Dividend of £10 
p Cent. Amounting to……….£35,395„7„11 are Lodged with the Company's Accountant 
or Cashier --- And We do not find, that any further Debts due from the Company in 
England at the time of the said Agreement have appear'd to remain unsatisfied, 
Except the three following Debts viz
t. 
To Duncan M'Laughn late Sailor in the Dorothy 






Aylmer late Surgeon of the Union deceas'd as p      55„15„5 




x. to John Bennet who was 
Adm
r. to Tho: Bennet late Factor at Accra       71„18  95 









Which are to be paid by the Company out of the beforemention'd monys in their 
hands. And therefore, Wee are of the Opinion that the said Trustees have so far 
perform'd their said Trust, that there remains only the said Sum of £4,877„17„9 1/4 to 
be paid by them to the Company, for the Uses and purposes afores
d. to compleat the 
Performance thereof: All which is nevertheless submitted to the Judgement of the 
Court. www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 
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